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Innovation and Unpriced Entertainment
It’s easy to disrespect advertising. 
Ads interrupt football games, impede 
news reports, and slow Internet search-
es. It should be no surprise, then, if 
the social usefulness of advertising 
is underestimated. Even economists, 
usually so mindful of the benefits of 
free markets, have often been unaware 
of the multiple benefits advertising 
provides.
Consider its role in new product 
development, the source of so much 
economic progress. If potential users 
lthough advertising is often the object of much 
disrespect, it nonetheless plays a significant 
role in the economy. For one thing, it helps 
consumers find out about new products, and 
new products have been rising in economic importance. 
Therefore, this relationship between new products and 
advertising makes it worthwhile to revisit the economics 
of advertising. In this article, Len Nakamura discusses 
advertising’s role as a productive economic activity as 
well as its value as a long-term investment and its role 
in subsidizing entertainment, such as TV and radio 
broadcasts.
don’t find out about new products so 
that they can buy them, firms will 
have little incentive to create them. 
That’s where advertising comes in: It 
helps consumers learn more quickly 
about the existence and properties of 
new products, so they can buy them, 
thereby making themselves, as well 
as the firms that made the products, 
better off.
Advertising thus helps firms and 
users benefit more from creativity. 
Larger returns increase the expected 
rewards to creativity, encouraging new 
product development and productivity 
gains. Since new products have been 
rising in economic importance, this 
nexus between new products and ad-
vertising makes it worthwhile to revisit 
the economics of advertising. Advertis-
ing — although widely disrespected 
— can be an unusually productive 
economic activity. Two other aspects 
of advertising are often overlooked: its 
value as a long-term investment and its 
role in subsidizing entertainment such 
as TV and radio broadcasts. 
ADVERTISING: HOW IT WORKS 
AND HOW WE VIEW IT
 Advertising has been derided as 
being, on its face, a creator of wasteful 
monopoly.  In this view, advertising 
creates an artificial monopoly that, in 
turn, compensates the maker of the 
advertised product for the expense 
of advertising. Consumers would be 
better off without advertising. The 
additional price paid for the advertised 
product may waste economic resources 
if it does nothing to enhance the prod-
uct. The British economist Nicholas 
Kaldor worried about this aspect of 
advertising in his seminal article. Can 
advertising do anything to enhance a 
product?  It is only words and images, 
smoke and mirrors.  
Advertising Reduces Search 
Costs. Is it so obvious that words 
really do nothing?  Perhaps advertis-
ing makes a product more valuable to 
consumers. To see how it can do so, we 
begin by recognizing that advertising is 
a form of communication, of transmit-
ting information. The systematic study 
of information transmission dates 
from University of Chicago economist 
George Stigler’s classic 1961 article 
on information.  In that article, he 
directly addressed advertising, arguing 
that it can be defined as communicat-
ing with consumers about products. 
 Stigler focused on the simple case 
of consumers who know a product 
exists but not where to buy it, and who 
might have to expend time and energy 
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to locate it.  In this case, advertising 
that lets consumers know where to 
buy a product (or its price) can lower 
the consumers’ search costs. A bird in 
hand being worth more than one in 
the bush, advertising raises the price a 
consumer will pay at a given location.
Advertising New Products. 
Another type of informative advertis-
ing tells consumers about the qualities 
of new products. New products are 
protected from competition by patents 
and copyrights, but these protections 
do not inform consumers about the 
existence of the new products and 
their attributes. This is the job of 
advertising; advertising helps consum-
ers adopt new products faster, speeding 
profits for the new product’s develop-
ers. Since the developer’s monopoly is 
only temporary, speed is crucial. For 
example, the now-familiar silhouette 
iPod dancers have been used to help 
create awareness of the Apple iPod and 
induce millions of new consumers to 
participate in the legal downloading of 
music. In turn, Apple reaped large re-
wards for this more convenient method 
of obtaining music.  
Persuasion to Change Con-
sumer Preferences. Advertising of 
well-known products that doesn’t 
provide price or seller locations does 
not appear to be informative. Consum-
ers know that beers and colas exist. 
How then does advertising create 
value? One answer is that advertising 
persuades. The industrial economist 
Richard Caves wrote in 1967, “[Adver-
tising] seeks to change our preference 
patterns and create wants which our 
private introspection would deny….
Where advertising departs from its 
function of informing us and seeks 
to persuade or deceive us, it tends to 
become a waste of resources.”
In this view, persuasion is seen 
as a distortion of desire. Consumers 
don’t know their true desires in the 
wake of advertising or possibly didn’t 
know their true desires before the 
advertising. But can we use the tools 
of economic analysis to study consum-
ers who have a distorted view of their 
wants, either before or after a change 
in preferences? Economists Avinash 
Dixit and Victor Norman in their 
1978 article argued that we should not 
include distorted preferences in welfare 
analysis, but they note that we can 
analyze how the consumer is affected if 
we use either criterion consistently: the 
consumer’s pre-advertising preferences 
or post-advertising preferences.
To understand what this means, 
consider an alternative mechanism for 
a change in preferences. For example, 
a hot summer may boost consum-
ers’ purchases of air conditioners. We 
judge the new quantities as being right 
for the consumer, given that the hot 
summer has occurred — we don’t use 
the purchases from a cool summer 
to argue that consumers have been 
fooled. With persuasive advertising, 
however, demand has changed, but 
without anything concrete to point 
to as the cause of the change. In this 
view, consumers have been fooled. But 
if consumers can be fooled, they can 
also wise up — they can be “unfooled.”   
For any specific piece of advertising, 
you don’t know which has occurred.  
So what to do?
Dixit and Norman argued that 
if you obtain the same results using 
either criterion, you have a convincing 
analysis. And once you consider both, 
they argue that under either standard, 
most persuasive advertising is likely 
to be excessive from society’s point of 
view. They point out that if advertis-
ing raises the consumer’s demand 
for a product, two effects raise the 
advertiser’s profit. One is that consum-
ers are willing to buy more of a product 
at any given price, making themselves 
and the advertiser better off. To this 
extent, consumers’ and advertisers’ 
interests are aligned, and advertising 
may be a good thing.  
But a second effect is that adver-
tising may either raise or lower the 
price of the product. If the price rises, 
all consumers of this good pay more for 
each unit of the good; the advertiser 
is made better off without any corre-
sponding benefit to consumers. To that 
extent, the advertiser has an incentive 
to spend money on advertising without 
benefit to consumers; advertising is 
a pure cost – what economists call a 
deadweight loss.  Furthermore, Dixit 
and Norman show that as long as this 
second incentive exists, firms with 
market power will spend too much 
on advertising. They show that as 
advertising approaches the level that 
maximizes the advertiser’s profit, the 
last dollar spent is entirely this pure 
cost. This analysis does not imply that 
society would be better off banning 
advertising, but it does imply that in 
these cases, we would certainly be 
better off with a little less advertising. 
One way of getting advertisers to re-
duce their spending would be to apply 
a small tax to advertising expenditures.
On the other hand, it is possible 
that the price to consumers could fall 
as a result of advertising, for example, 
if having a larger market could result 
in lower per unit costs.  In this case, 
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the post-advertising tastes, although it 
is possible they could still be worse off 
under pre-advertising tastes.
This analysis is valid whether 
we choose the consumer’s prefer-
ences before or after the advertising 
as the valid criterion, but it assumes 
that advertising has no impact on the 
product’s true value to the consumer. 
The last dollar of advertising gets the 
consumer to buy a tiny bit more of a 
product, so that the marginal benefit 
to the consumer is, at best, very small 
and fully offset by what the consumer 
is paying for the product. But what if 
advertising affects the true value of 
customers, e.g., suppose advertising is 
informative. Then the last advertis-
ing dollar reaches a consumer who 
wouldn’t otherwise buy the advertised 
product, and this transmission of in-
formation can potentially have a large 
benefit.
Thus, when advertising is infor-
mative, the last consumer is made 
better off from the last dollar of expen-
diture.
Advertising to Change the Prod-
uct and Not Preferences. Stigler and 
Gary Becker argue that as a general 
methodological principle, economists 
should think first of changes in tastes 
as reflecting a change in the product 
itself, rather than as a distortion of 
consumer preferences. In this view, 
advertising can make any product a 
new product. As a consequence, adver-
tising generally has large benefits for 
consumers. Is this argument reason-
able?  Can this “new product” view of 
advertising be extended to examples 
that appear to be persuasion?  
One easy example is that an 
existing product might be advertised 
because a new use has been found for 
it. For example, aspirin acts as a blood 
thinner to reduce the risk of heart 
attacks. This raises the demand for 
aspirin because of information gleaned 
from studies of aspirin.    
A less scientific example of a new 
use for an existing product is fast food. 
Fast food was once seen mainly as a 
summertime treat, but McDonald’s 
pioneered the idea that fast food could 
be eaten in the winter, as a cheap 
break from the routine of home cook-
ing. In the late 1960s, McDonald’s 
used advertising on Macy’s Thanksgiv-
ing Day parade and the Super Bowl to 
suggest to consumers that they didn’t 
need to wait until summer to enjoy a 
Big Mac. In the wake of the advertise-
ments, winter sales rose dramatically 
– and seasonal patterns were perma-
nently affected. Similarly, consumers 
once thought long-distance phone 
calls were too expensive for chatting. 
As long-distance prices fell, AT&T’s 
“Reach Out and Touch Someone” 
commercials, which urged consumers 
to call their relatives and friends long 
distance on Sundays, changed con-
sumer phone habits permanently.  
Commercials may provide infor-
mation through images that are an 
indirect or highly abbreviated form 
of communication. For example, an 
Apple iPod permits a consumer to 
carry around a lot of songs, effectively 
freeing the listener from having to 
carry a stack of CDs and a compara-
tively bulky player, and to move freely 
without the music skipping. All of this 
freedom is suggested by the hip/silly 
motions of the iPod silhouette dancers; 
this image would then lead a potential 
buyer of an iPod to engage in addition-
al investigation before actually buying 
an iPod.  
Also, the fact that a product exists 
doesn’t mean we remember to buy it. 
In that case, advertising may act like a 
Post-it® note to remind us of products 
we have forgotten to buy recently. 
After all, habit is a tricky business. As 
consumers, we value both familiarity 
and variety.  But because we have lim-
ited memory, it is hard to keep these in 
balance. We replace items we like with 
new items as we seek variety, but we 
may forget how much pleasure we got 
from the old item, until an advertise-
ment reminds us to go back to it.
As TV viewers, we may be exces-
sively irritated by advertising and see 
it as being uninformative because it 
isn’t informing us. Most of the time, we 
aren’t in the market for the car being 
advertised or have already decided 
what beer or vacation we prefer. The 
advertising is directed at someone else, 
someone more open to the subject 
of that product (who, we may feel, 
is a weak-willed victim of persuasive 
advertising). In this case, all the ad 
in question does is get in the way of 
our entertainment. If each person is 
enlightened by only 1 percent of all 
ads, the gains to advertiser and shop-
per may outweigh the costs.  Adver-
tiser and shopper would be better off if 
somehow advertising became less scat-
tershot. But that doesn’t mean that, 
given the technology at hand, advertis-
ing isn’t informative in its impact.
Different observers will inevitably 
have different perceptions about the 
extent to which advertising is persua-
sive or informative. Nevertheless, as 
the importance of new products rises, 
the informative component of adver-
tising is likely to rise with it, leading 
more people to believe in advertising’s 
social benefit.1 
Advertising may act 
like a Post-it® note to 
remind us of products 
we have forgotten to
buy recently.
1 See my 2003 article on evidence for the grow-
ing — and substantial — amount of economic 
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INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING: 
HOW VALUABLE?
Let’s look a bit more closely at 
informative advertising. It is not like 
the normal economic products for 
which we can rely on Adam Smith’s 
Invisible Hand to assure us that the 
market provides the right amount of 
economic activity in producing and 
consuming them. Usually, the Invis-
ible Hand theory applies to products 
that competitors are free to duplicate 
and whose price, therefore, accurately 
reflects the cost of reproducing them.  
Economists Gene Grossman 
and Carl Shapiro looked at this more 
complex product — advertising — and 
asked whether producers have the 
right incentives to produce informative 
advertising when there is more than 
one advertised product. They showed 
that there are two opposing forces: In-
formation about products makes con-
sumers better off (“consumer surplus”) 
but at the expense of other producers 
(“business stealing”).
Consumer Surplus.  Information 
about a product increases the likeli-
hood that a consumer will purchase 
a good that has more value to him 
than the goods he is replacing.  The 
average new consumer reached by an 
ad would be willing to pay more for a 
product than the producer is asking, 
even though the producer is mak-
ing an additional profit because of 
market power. To this extent, too little 
advertising is provided. The consum-
ers who have not been reached by 
advertising would be better off if they 
could pay the advertiser to reach them, 
because they would gain more than 
the payment would cost them, but such 
payments are difficult to arrange.
Business Stealing. Advertising 
typically induces some consumers to 
switch from one firm with market 
power to another, thereby depriving 
the first firm of some monopoly profit.  
So some of the profit the second firm 
receives from the new consumption 
is “stolen” from the old producer. To 
this extent, producers have too much 
incentive to advertise. Put another 
way, the first firm would be better off 
if it could bribe the second firm not 
to advertise. But, again, this trade is 
difficult to arrange and moreover may 
violate anti-trust laws.
In addition to these two effects, 
however, when advertising includes 
entertainment as a byproduct, consum-
ers derive an additional benefit. This 
makes it more likely that advertising 
is actually undersupplied. Moreover, 
because all new products need to be 
advertised, the additional costs of ad-
vertising may limit the creation of new 
products. So if we take advertisement 
into consideration, the arguments for 





Consider the advertising-fuelled 
rise of radio. Radio was a crucial 
development in the 20th century and 
took hold beginning around 1923. 
Radio broadcasts helped jazz burst out 
on a national and international scale, 
suddenly changing the course of world 
music and defining the decade of the 
1920s as the Jazz Age. Other examples 
of radio’s impact were FDR’s fireside 
chats, baseball play-by-play, and the 
CBS symphony orchestra’s perfor-
mances. 
The rise of TV broadcasting in 
the 1950s also depended on adver-
tising, and much of the rise of the 
Internet was spurred by advertising. 
Of course, the compliment went both 
ways. These innovations lowered 
the cost of advertising. They saved 
resource costs while offering advertis-
ers greater diversity in their ability to 
reach target audiences. 
Stigler discussed the use of enter-
tainment to attract buyers to informa-
tion. He argued that the assimilation 
of information is not easy or pleasant 
and that buyers will assimilate it more 
easily in an enjoyable form – just as air 
conditioning a store makes shopping 
more enjoyable. Consumers are more 
likely to buy products whose informa-
tion is broadcast in the most easily 
absorbed form.  
Zero: An Uncomfortable Price 
for Economics. Entertainment that’s 
a byproduct of advertising may fly 
beneath the radar of economics, how-
ever, because it has zero price and so 
zero sales in nominal terms. How can 
a good have a zero price if it is valued 
by consumers?  This can happen if 
the good is sold along with another; 
that is, it is a joint product. When 
entertainment and the advertised item 
form a joint product, they are much 
like honey and pollination as the joint 
product of bees. If farmers are willing 
to pay a lot for pollination services, the 
supply of honey will soar and the price 
of honey could fall to zero if honey 
went into excess supply.2 Similarly, 
entertainment and news may be free: 
Just as the price of honey might fall to 
2 When honey prices are high enough, beekeep-
ers may have to pay farmers to situate their 
hives in their orchards. Thus, pollination servic-
es may have a positive price in certain circum-
stances, such as when farmers pay beekeepers 
to pollinate their fields; in other circumstances, 
pollen becomes an input into beekeeping and 
pollination has a negative price.
The rise of TV broadcasting in the 1950s also 
depended on advertising.Business Review  Q4  2005   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
zero, advertising can make the price of 
an entertainment fall to zero.  
The price of entertainment 
subsidized by advertising could also 
be zero because it is difficult to collect 
payments from the consumer. That 
is, the entertainment producer might 
prefer to charge consumers a posi-
tive price, but the cost of collecting 
the price might make that infeasible. 
For example, broadcast radio and 
TV function by sending signals off 
into the ether, where radios and TVs 
receive them for free. Nowadays these 
broadcasts can be sent encrypted, as 
they are with satellite and cable TV, to 
collect fees from the consumers. But 
back when radio and TV were first in-
vented, the electronic devices capable 
of such coding and decoding were far 
in the future. So the technology made 
it necessary to have the broadcasts 
supported by advertising, rather than 
by direct sale.  
 
WHAT IS FREE 
ENTERTAINMENT WORTH
TO CONSUMERS?
How important have expenditures 
on entertainment been? Neil Borden’s 
pioneering 1942 book on the eco-
nomics of advertising introduced the 
notion that news and entertainment 
media are subsidized by advertisement 
and empirically estimated the size of 
the subsidy.
First, let’s look at the heyday 
of radio. In 1935, total advertising 
expenditures on radio were $80 mil-
lion, according to Borden, roughly 0.1 
percent of GDP. Roughly half of that 
went to entertainment — payments to 
live talent, transcriptions of shows, and 
leases of phonograph records. Econom-
ically, this is small potatoes. Culturally, 
however, it was a revolution.
One piece of evidence for radio’s 
revolutionary impact is the expendi-
tures it displaced. As broadcast profes-
sional music substituted for music cre-
ated in the home, sales of pianos and 
other home instruments fell. Econo-
mist F. M. Scherer shows that the 
timing of the decline of expenditures 
on home instruments coincided with 
the rise of radio sales: The explosion of 
radio sales from 1923 to 1925 coin-
cided with a steep drop in piano sales, 
particularly player pianos.3 In 1923, 
344,000 pianos were produced in the 
U.S.; by 1929, the number had fallen to 
121,000, a nominal sales decline of $67 
million (U.S. Census of Manufactures, 
1925 and 1931). And this is just one 
of the many areas affected. No doubt 
the ability to hear the CBS orchestra 
or Louis Armstrong on the radio raised 
the recreation enjoyed by consumers.
What about the rise of television? 
In a very nice study, Roger Noll and 
his co-authors present quantitative 
evidence on the monetary value of the 
rise of TV. How can we find out what 
consumers would pay for an item they 
receive for free? The answer Noll and 
his co-authors found was that some 
potential TV consumers could not 
receive broadcast for free, and they 
argued that the amount these viewers 
were willing to pay was a window into 
the value of TV for all consumers. 
In sparsely populated areas of rural 
America, broadcasters did not find it 
worthwhile to send signals over the air; 
the cost of the transmitters could not 
be justified.  A commercial solution 
that became available in the 1960s was 
community cable TV. The amount 
consumers who were not served by 
broadcast TV were willing to pay for 
receiving the broadcasts via cable 
is a clear measure of the monetary 
value of the usually free broadcasts. It 
turned out that, by 1969, 80 percent 
of households in areas served were 
willing to pay $5 a month for no-frills 
cable access to regular broadcast TV. 
Noll and his co-authors argued that 
consumers who did have access to TV 
broadcasts would have been willing to 
pay at least the same amount to receive 
the broadcasts, if they had had to. 
Five dollars a month, spread across 80 
percent of all U.S. households, would 
have amounted to $3 billion, or about 
0.4 percent of household income. 
But this estimate is actually on 
the low side. When Noll and his 
co-authors did a careful job of estimat-
ing the total amount that consumers 
would have been willing to pay, they 
came up with a much larger number: 
5.1 percent of household income in 
1969. They arrived at this number by 
using variations in cable TV charges, 
characteristics of the households, and 
the availability of partial broadcast TV 
in some areas, to tease out exactly how 
much each of the three broadcast net-
work channels was worth to consum-
ers. (At the time, there were only three 
broadcast channels: CBS, NBC, and 
ABC.) The fact that in some areas one 
or two channels were available over 
the air enabled them to put a price on 
each additional channel, based on the 
reasoning that each additional channel 
available over the air should lower the 
demand for cable. However, the precise 
number (5.1 percent) depends on the 
exact type of equation used.   
This raises the question: Is such a 
large number plausible? One measure 
of the impact on consumers is what 
they did with their time. Families 
stayed home in huge numbers to watch 
broadcast TV (Figure 1); by 1970, 
Americans were spending 22 hours 
a week watching. This is a striking 
shift in consumers’ use of leisure time 
— plausibly one-fourth of weekly 
leisure time after we eliminate work 
(including household production ac-
3 At the same time, the quality of phonographs 
was improving dramatically. Moreover, there 
was clearly a complementarity between radios 
and phonographs, as exposure to music over the 
radio encouraged sales of phonograph records.26   Q4  2005 Business Review  www.philadelphiafed.org
tivities), commuting, and sleep hours.4 
Clearly, free television outcompeted a 
lot of alternatives, both free and costly, 
for consumers’ limited time. To get 
a better feeling for expenditures on 
leisure-time activities, consider those 
recreational and personal care activi-
ties that consumers pay for—which 
includes services such as movies, cable 
TV, beauty salons, golfing, and specta-
tor sports, and goods such as books, 
electronic equipment, and toiletries. 
Consumers spent about 8 percent 
of their income in the late 1960s on 
these leisure-time goods and services, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. TV by then had be-
come the dominant form of leisure, so 
perhaps a consumer value of 5 percent 
of income for TV is not implausible, 
although it may be an overestimate.5
Do we see this shift in consumer 
expenditures on alternative forms of 
recreation, the way we saw the decline 
in player pianos? Economists would 
have expected expenditures on recre-
ational services, as a luxury good, to be 
rising as a proportion of expenditures, 
since per capita real incomes were 
rising and households could afford 
more luxuries. Instead, real recre-
ational services fell as a proportion 
of expenditures in the 1950s (Figure 
2). As happened with radio, consum-
ers substituted TV for other forms of 
priced entertainment. 
Thus, free entertainment and 
news played an important role in 
making consumers better off. We have 
already pointed out that corpora-
tions may be better off over sustained 
periods of time because of advertis-
ing. How might these factors figure 
into our calculations of the value of 
economic activity?  Should they affect 
how we look at profitability and U.S. 




Let’s consider how advertising 
appears in the national accounts. To 
take the elements of the analysis step 
by step, let’s start by thinking about 
advertising without entertainment, 
and let’s consider short-run advertis-
ing, whose impact is simply to raise 
sales in the same period in which the 
advertising is purchased. When a mail 
order company sends out a catalog of 
clothing items, the costs of the catalog 
4 Time diary data from the American Time 
Use Survey show that in 2004, Americans 15 
and older spent 2.6 hours per day (18 hours 
per week) watching television as their primary 
activity. This does not count time when the 
television set is on but something else — such as 
eating or household chores — is the primary ac-
tivity. Unfortunately, the time-use survey does 
not publish data on TV watching as a secondary 
activity.  Even if we take the time-use survey 
as a better measure, the implication is still that 
watching television is a major leisure activity of 
American adults.
FIGURE 1
Cable and Broadcast TV
Weekly Viewing Hours
Note: These data splice together data on annual viewing hours for 1984 to 2000 from Veronis 
Suhler Stevenson published in the 1994, 1999, and 2003 U.S. Statistical Abstract, with average 
viewing per day data for 1984 and earlier from A.C. Nielsen from the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 
1985 and earlier. The two series do not agree in 1984; the former gives 1,520 hours per year, 
which is 29.2 hours per week, while the latter gives 7 hours per day, or 49 hours per week. I forced 
the Nielsen data to equal the Veronis Suhler Stevenson data in 1984.
5 Personal care and recreation does not include, 
for example, hotels, restaurants, foreign travel, 
air travel, cars and gasoline, household services, 
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are paid for by the sales the company 
rings up from it. The costs of design-
ing, printing, and mailing the catalog 
(the inputs) show up as income to 
those who created the advertising, 
while the catalog itself (the output) is 
simply considered part of the sweaters 
and other clothing sold. Thus, the ad-
vertising shows up nowhere in output, 
except as an ingredient of the items 
sold, just as the cost of the warehouse 
where the sweaters were stored is an 
ingredient.
The same thing holds true for 
advertising with entertainment. When 
a “Seinfeld” rerun appears on TV, its 
cost and its entertainment value are 
considered just like the postage in a 
direct mail solicitation — from the 
perspective of the national accounts, 
the entertainment’s only value is to sell 
the advertised product.  
Entertainment. How should our 
official national income measures 
account for the benefit gained from 
entertainment that is a byproduct of 
advertising? If we are to accurately 
measure economic growth in the U.S., 
we should include the contributions 
of radio and TV broadcasts to con-
sumption. Normally, entertainment 
is included in personal consumption 
expenditures according to its total 
sales. But the total sales of radio and 
TV broadcasts are zero, despite their 
quantity being positive, because their 
price is zero to the consumer.
But when these zero-price prod-
ucts became available, consumers 
were very much better off than they 
had been, as has been documented. 
How might we show a sensible, posi-
tive value for consumers? One way to 
measure the contribution would be to 
argue that the free entertainment ser-
vices paid for by advertisers, e.g., Jerry 
Seinfeld’s salary for TV performances, 
would have been paid for by consum-
ers. After all, these entertainment 
services are bid away from alternative 
paid entertainment venues (e.g., Jerry 
Seinfeld’s forgone Las Vegas revenue). 
If the economy is reasonably efficient, 
Jerry Seinfeld’s TV performances are 
more valuable to consumers than his 
potential Las Vegas performances, so 
the measure is a reasonable minimum. 
If we value this entertainment 
at cost, taking Seinfeld’s salary as 
this cost, we are taking an approach 
parallel to that of other zero-priced 
products, such as government-supplied 
education.  That is, in the national 
accounts we value public education at 
its cost.  
Suppose that radio and TV enter-
tainment services paid for by adver-
tisers amount to 20 percent of recre-
ational services paid for by consumers, 
as they did for much of the 1960s and 
1970s. Then we can estimate that the 
effect of these services is to increase 
the total real quantity of recreational 
services 20 percent. So real expen-
ditures go up 20 percent. Nominal 
expenditures are unchanged (since 
these services are being supplied at 
zero price). The net effect is to reduce 
the price of recreational services. This 
makes sense: The consumer has ob-
tained 20 percent more services with-
out spending any more. The effect of 
this calculation for radio and television 
is shown in Figure 2, where we have 
mapped out the part of ad expendi-
tures on radio and television that go to 
providing consumer entertainment. 
Note what has happened here. A 
dollar of advertising shows up in more 
than a dollar’s worth of output.  It 
FIGURE 2
Recreation Services as Proportion of
Personal Consumption Expenditures
With and Without Subsidy
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculations from Nakamura (2004).
Real Recreation Services including Subsidy
Real Recreation Services without Subsidy












1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Percent28   Q4  2005 Business Review  www.philadelphiafed.org
shows up in the value of the advertised 
product as a dollar’s worth of extra 
value for the consumer and the adver-
tiser. How sizable is this extra value? 
In my 2004 working paper, I have 
made some rough estimates of the part 
of advertising that goes into consumer 
entertainment. There I have estimated 
that for each dollar spent on broadcast 
television advertising, some 60 cents of 
free entertainment is produced — rais-
ing recreation output without raising 
costs. Because broadcast TV and radio 
advertising expenditures amount to 
about $60 billion, entertainment is 
boosted by $36 billion.  Advertising 
has become an unusually productive 
economic activity. According to my 
rough estimates, if we add in contribu-
tions to all media, advertising adds 
close to $70 billion in entertainment 
consumption to U.S. output.6
Advertising in Corporate In-
come and Expense Accounting. Let’s 
briefly go over the issue of how to best 
incorporate advertising in corporate 
income and expense accounting, an 
issue I’ve already addressed in more de-
tail in my 2003 article on intangibles.
Currently, advertising expenditure 
is typically expensed; that is, the total 
cost is recognized immediately and 
subtracted from income. This is the 
correct treatment of advertising to the 
extent that profits are recouped during 
the same period in which expenses are 
laid out. For example, a department 
6 There are two ways in which advertising 
should be included in the national income ac-
counts but is not. One is that the entertainment 
subsidized by advertising should be included 
in personal consumption expenditures. The 
other is that some proportion of advertising 
expenditures should be considered investment. 
Until this proportion is estimated and included 
in investment, gross investment in advertising 
will be underestimated in the national income 
accounts, where it is all treated as if it were 
short-lived. See my 2003 paper for additional 
discussion.
store or an auto dealership advertis-
ing a Thanksgiving weekend sale will 
garner all the value from this advertis-
ing in that weekend, and it is properly 
expensed. A going-out-of-business 
sale is the pure type of an advertising 
expense that has no long-run value. 
The principle here can be il-
lustrated by considering a $10 million 
machine that lasts 10 years and creates 
$2 million worth of value each year. 
One way to account for it would be to 
expense it in the first year of produc-
tion. The firm would show a loss of $8 
million in the first year, and a profit 
of $2 million in all the others. The 
alternative is to capitalize the invest-
ment and expense it over the 10 years 
of its useful life. The firm’s expenditure 
would show up as a $10 million capital 
item, whose value depreciates $1 mil-
lion each year. Only the depreciation 
would show up on the income and 
expense statement. If we do this, the 
firm shows $1 million in profit each 
year. Accountants have decided that 
this latter approach makes more sense 
for physical investments, since, in fact, 
the firm is not doing poorly the first 
year and suddenly improving for the 
rest of the decade but is making a nice 
profit each year.  
So if Apple spends $150 to 
manufacture an iPod and $50 to 
advertise it, then sells it for $200, its 
profit is zero — provided the advertis-
ing has not created a durable asset, 
such as brand loyalty, for Apple. But 
if the advertising makes it possible 
for Apple to continue to sell iPods for 
nine more years without continuing 
to advertise, the advertising should 
be expensed over the 10 years that 
Apple sells the product. Advertising 
that confers a long-term advantage in 
the marketplace should be capitalized 
and depreciated, which spreads out the 
expense over the useful life of the ad-
vertising. For example, some products, 
such as prescription drugs, have strong 
temporary monopolies, and advertising 
for them may properly be depreciated 
over the patent’s lifetime. Other prod-
ucts, such as breakfast cereals and cola 
beverages, build brand loyalty that can 
last for many years.  
A practical difficulty is that it may 
be hard to know in advance how long-
lived advertising is going to be. How 
long will iPod be a successful product? 
Will the consumers who are led to buy 
a product continue to think that it’s a 
good product – or will a new product 
offer greater value?
Many articles have explored the 
longevity of advertising and obtained 
different results.  What most of the 
studies have shown is that not all 
advertising is long-lived, but they also 
suggest that at least some advertising 
is long-lived. The general practice of 
expensing advertising of new products 
will result in profits being understated 
in the short run and overstated in the 
long run. This problem is similar to 
that associated with the expensing of 
research and development.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to 
analyze how advertising can have very 
long-lived value. Even when one can 
build up such a picture, it is difficult 
to analyze with certainty how much 
of a company’s or an industry’s long-
lived market power is due to adver-
tising.  While a few studies, such as 
Aviv Nevo’s study of the ready-to-eat 
breakfast cereal industry, have very 
carefully attacked the question of how 
long-lived market power and profitabil-
ity can survive, there are not enough 
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such studies to form a coherent picture 
of long-lived advertising power.  
One avenue that needs greater 
pursuit is the relationship between 
advertising and new products.  To the 
extent that new products create per-
manent gains in consumption, adver-
tising may be said to have a permanent 
asset value to society.  This is a line of 
research where much empirical work 
remains to be done.
CONCLUSION
What do we make of advertis-
ing? One view is that advertising is 
wasteful, annoying, and distorting. 
There may well be a significant part 
of advertising that fits this view. But 
there is a very large, and growing, por-
tion of advertising that is informative 
and constitutes a social benefit, as is 
the case with most economic activity. 
Moreover, we have identified a part of 
advertising – the part that subsidizes 
entertainment – that contributes to 
consumer welfare but has not been 
counted in output. When we add up 
advertising’s contributions, they appear 
to be substantial. Two cheers for adver-
tising — or maybe four?
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